It is argued that traditional functional explanations of the incest taboo do not suf ciently supply causal conditions. It is widely acknowledged that the incest taboo, although universal among human societies, is largely a feature of human behavior. Husserl's investigations of intentionality are introduced to supply the particularly human element by which the taboo may be understood. So as to illumine the contrast between the con icting intentionalities, a classical Aristotelian contrast between eros and parent/ child philia is drawn. Parent/child philia and eros, although both requisite for the survival of the species, are shown to be crosspurposeful in several ways. Husserl's understanding of 'negation,' as it applies to affective and practical intentionalities, is reconsidered. It is thereby explained how parental/child affection and erotic love, are 'incompossible' and not only con ict, but 'nullify' and 'cancel out' each other, generating the 'taboo'.
of various primate species prefer to nd sexual partners outside their the natal group (Maryanski and Turner, 1992) .
How, then, can such an exclusion between family-like bonds established in childhood and sexuality be explained? A phenomenological explanation of how two types of human bonding, namely the family bond established in early childhood and erotic passion are practically incompatible can answer this question. Our proposal, it will be argued, ts with how the incest taboo is experienced. What will be proposed is, to speak the language of phenomenology, that the incest taboo arises from an incompossibility of two types of intentionality. The taboo is universal because both types of intentionality are requisite for the survival of the species. The intentionality of eros is requisite inasmuch as it elicits sexual reproduction. The intentionality of the child/parent bond is requisite inasmuch as it enables survival through infancy and childhood. Both types of intentionality, as practical projects, are nonetheless incompatible. Once the exclusivity of these types of intentionality are described, I shall explain in more detail the nature of this affective and practical intentionality.
The Eros/Philia Con ict
Distinguishing between kinds of affective bonds has long been attempted by philosophers, psychologists and anthropologists. I propose to develop what I think is a phenomenologically accurate distinction between two kinds of affective bonds. This contrast is far enough removed from our own historical period as to warrant consideration as persistent, if not perennial. In particular, I would like to return to the distinction between philia and eros as proposed by Aristotle. In making this distinction, Heidegger 's celebrated characterization of Aristotle as the last philosopher "to force inquiry back to the phenomena" perhaps is not so great an overstatement (Heidegger, 1988, p. 232) . Further, the philia/eros distinction can be made analytically precise. I shall review rst Aristotle's understanding of the bond that exists between parents and children conceived as a kind of 'mutual regard,' i.e., as a kind of philia. I'll then juxtapose this variety of human bonding with eros. Afterwards, I'll generalize how these two types of love deserve to be treated as intentional projects which exclude each other. Aristotle (1984) describes the love of children for parents in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, the books on Friendship, i.e., on Philia.
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In the Nicomachean Ethics there are three statements (1162a4-8, 1161b18, 1161b29) to the effect that children love their parents because parents are a source of their existence. The fullest account is in Book VIII, chapter 12:
The friendship of children to parents, and of men to gods, is a relation to them as to something good and superior; for they have conferred the greatest bene ts since they are the causes of their being and of their nourishment, and of their education from their birth (1162a, 4-8).
On the other hand, the love of parents for children, according to Aristotle, is similar in that it concerns the generation of one's self. In the case of parental love, however, it is founded upon reproducing and extending one's self, or at least part of one's self, in the form of another self. In the Nicomachean Ethics we have: "for parents love their children as being part of themselves," (1161b17).
And, later, "Parents, then, love their children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate existence a sort of other selves)" (1161b28).
Basing parental love on the principle that a producer loves her product, Aristotle goes on to declare that parental love is stronger than lial love, and that mothers love children sooner than fathers do:
The originator is more attached to his offspring than the offspring to their begetter, for the product belongs to the producer (e.g., a tooth or hair or anything else to him whose it is), but the producer does not belong to the product, or belongs to a lesser degree (1161b22-24).
Since the parent knows the child at birth and the mother knows the child she carries more than the father does, mothers and fathers love their children "as soon as they are born, but children love their parents only after time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding or perception," (1161b25-27).
Aristotle describes here the ideal case of loving parents and children who recognize the importance of this love. Yet, there is little question that parentchild relations often do not live up to the ideal Aristotle describes. We shall return to the case of derelict or absent parents later. However, for now, let us observe that parent-child love turns upon a certain axis which I'll call the 'generation or regeneration of self axis.' In cases of both parental and lial love, nothing less than one's own existence is at issue. It is directly so in the case of children's love for their parents, and by extension to another self in the case of parents' love for children.
How, then, does eros compare? Eros contrasts radically with philia. First, eros does not require the mutuality which applies to even the more remote cases of philia.
2 It is hardly unusual to form an erotic relation with a stranger. It's not only that Cyranos abound in the world, it's also that eros does not require the recognition of the beloved. Otherwise, the publication of romance novels and tabloid stories about media idols would be in trouble. Secondly, erotic relations are connected with appetite insofar as they entail a longing for the loved, pain in the person's absence, and pleasure in recollection, (1167a4).
For eros one must desire the beloved's presence, (1385a22-24). Aristotle makes the longing for the beloved during her absence a sign of love. A third feature of eros is that, unlike philia, it requires a sensuous object. Eros is formed "according to the sensuous," (1167a7-8). "For no one falls in love without being delighted by their form," (1245a25-27). It is for this reason that the lovesick always take pleasure "in talking, writing or composing verses about the beloved, for it seems to them that all this recollection makes the object of their affection perceptible," (1370b20-22).
As indicated earlier, we are returning to the Aristotelian distinction between eros and philia because these kinds of human affective bonds re ect what, even today, is a commonsense understanding of different kinds of love. And, the distinction between eros and philia allows us to note several contrasts vis-à-vis eros and the affection between parents and children. These contrasts are, rst, that eros is not necessarily mutual, while the affection between parents and their children necessarily is mutual, although often unequally so. Second, the affection between parents and children, unlike eros, is not based in a desire for the presence of the beloved, but on the causes of, or extension of, one's own existence. And third, parent-child love does not depend upon a delight in the sensuous form of the beloved, but rather on the fact that parents and children see in each other a generation or regeneration of their own life.
Let us consider further these contrasts. First, as previously mentioned, the account of parent/child love we are taking from Aristotle conveys an ideal.
It represents a felicitous and ful lled parent/child bond in which biological parents sustain children through childhood and foster their children's edu- That the incest taboo requires the belief that someone is a parent or child itself implies 'intentional' relations in the phenomenological sense. Indeed, approaching the taboo through the intentionality of consciousness addresses how the taboo extends to absent or derelict parents, even if they do not participate in parent/child philia. The designation, 'father' or 'mother,' is enough to engender the repugnance since the designations, 'father' or 'mother,' convey the belief that a father or mother, as a type, ought to sustain his or her child through infancy and childhood. Husserl, in his remarks on family roles in the Nachlass, published in Volume XIV of Husserliana, explains that the sense of 'father' and 'mother' as well as of other family members, arises from the function each family member serves in fostering the family as a whole (Husserl, 1973a, p. 181.3-9) . By contrast, "arti cially" (künstlich) established roles, such as the roles of master and servant and those established by social clubs and unions, may be annulled. "The runaway slave is no longer a slave," as Husserl states (Husserl, 1973a, p. 181.38-39) . In the case of family roles, however, there are responsibilities which are not 'arti cial' but 'natural,' (Husserl, 1973a, pp. 180.38, 181.12) . Absent or derelict parents, however de facto absent and derelict they may be, inasmuch as they cannot absent themselves from the designations, 'father' or 'mother,' are subject to the same norm of mutuality, even if unrealized. The very designations, 'absent' and 'derelict,' presume a norm according to which an absence or dereliction counts as a deviation. Derelict and absent parents, by virtue of the meaning 'father' and 'mother,' sustain a relation which, in its intentionality, is mutual.
In our description, eros differs from philia in other ways than mutuality. Eros is located on an appetitive-sensuous axis and, in the absence of the other person, subject to longing or yearning. 3 Of course this is not to say the parents or children do not miss each other when apart. But the desire for, or by, the child is for different reasons. Loving parents miss their children, as children miss their parents. But, the parent who sorrows at the absence of a child, is relieved upon evidence of the child's well-being, just as the child is relieved at the appearance of the absent parent, sensing that its security and welfare is no longer at risk. Again, causes of generation and regeneration seem to be at issue with parent-child affection but not with eros.
According to the third difference between eros and philia, eros is based in the sensuous aspect of the beloved. "The pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love [eros] ," as Aristotle states (1167a4). Surely parents can and do pride themselves in the physical appearance of a child. But this is not a desire for their looks as such, which, as the Act II.ii Romeo says of Juliet, "would shame those stars/As daylight doth a lamp." Parents take delight in a child's looks more along the lines of accomplishment. This pride, again, suggests the regeneration of another self. Similarly a child may take pleasure in a beautiful mother or in a dapper father but again it is pride, which moves the child and that pride belies the nexus to the generation or regeneration of its own self.
To contrast eros and the philia between parents and children is not to deny that there are crossovers. Psychoanalysts of the last century made into a cri d'armes that children eroticize parents and brought incest, real or imagined, into the forefront of the etiology of neurosis. But leaving out for now, how incest may play into the psychopathology, there is nothing in the psychopathology of incest which rules out an intentive account. Incestuous fantasies aside, Husserl was surely correct to note that family roles, far from wholly encompassing a person's identity, involve as a matter of course, "neglect in the natural solicitude" which one family member, as father or mother, feels for other family members, perhaps because of "omissions, moments of egoism or irrationality" (Husserl, 1973a, p. 180.21-26) .
Indeed, without some lapses in the intentional project of parenting, it is dif cult to see how the incest taboo would have relevance. It may well be,
given that eros and parent/child love support reproduction and child development respectively, some degree of con ict is to be expected. Yet, the peculiarly human component of the incest taboo follows from the fact that the human animal is an intentive animal. Because we are human, we, perhaps along with some other primates (Maryanski and Turner, 1992) , inhabit a world lled with persons and things which are given, in our immediate experience, as meaningful. Some of these meanings con ict with one another to the extent that one meaning tends to 'cancel out' the other, in Husserl's terminology. 4 The cause of the incest taboo then becomes, in a sense, an 'incompossibility' of practical and affective intentions. In its practical and emotive intentionality, it compares to a kind of category error. One way to understand the horror of many Greek myths is to see these myths as circumscribing clashes in counterpurposeful beliefs. It is not only Oedipus who makes a whopper along spousal-lial lines. Other mythological gures suffer from radically mistaken beliefs as well. Thyestes mistakes his dead child for supper. Priam mistakes the peace offering of an arti cial horse for the enemy. Pentheus mistakes the god Dionysus for a truant boy, etc. Eros and parent-child love, as intentive projects, are incompatible, since, given the power that eros has over our lives, eros excludes the bene ts that come from parent-child affection. And that would lead to a very grave loss indeed considering how elemental parental/ child love is for the child's development and future.
What, then, is the problem with incestuous relations given the eros/philia contrast? The sketch of eros and the philia between parents and children implies that eros excludes fundamentals of parental/ lial love. Given that love between parents and children might be described along a 'generation or regeneration of self axis,' the potentialities of child development are at stake. Insofar as parent/child love has a goal of generation, or regeneration, accordingly, eros, by recasting the parent or child into a immediate sensuous object of desire, transforms the apprehension of a person and removes her or him from the long-term intentions, plans and deliberations which foster the generation or regeneration of self. As felt from a parent to a child, it, in effect, con icts with the child's potentiality for maturation. As felt from a child to a parent, it removes the parent from her or his de facto role as the source of existence and makes the child, in effect, parentless. Since the repugnance of incest arises from intentional relations which con ict with one other, the taboo appears even in imagination. Phaedra, after all, never actually has sexual relations with her step-son, Hippolytus. The tragedy is propelled by the mere prospect of their incest.
The Incest Taboo as the Product of 'Incompossible' Practical and Affective Intentions
We have proposed that the incest taboo arises from the incompatibility of practical and affective intentional relations in the phenomenological sense.
What, then, is meant by practical and affective intentionality as these terms are used here?
Husserl's investigation of the intentionality of consciousness is perhaps best known for his analyses of perception and cognitive judgments. But, Husserl also investigated in detail the intentionality he discovered in practical and affective concerns. In middle and later writings, Husserl often distinguishes 'theoretical,' 'practical' and 'affective' attitudes of consciousness. In making this division, he repeatedly asserts that there are logical structures in the affective and practical attitudes which are analogous to the logical structures in the theoretical attitude (Husserl, 1950 (Husserl, , pp. 269, 272, 279, 323/1982 . For example, Husserl states in §121 of Ideas I (Husserl, 1950 (Husserl, , p. 297/1982 ):
Or, as I usually express it, there is besides the doxic, "and" (the logical "and"), also an axiological and practical "and." The same holds for the word "or," and all the syntheses belonging here.
"Negation," Husserl explains in Experience and Judgment, "is not rst the business of the act of predicative judgment" but "already appears in the prepredicative sphere of receptive experience" (Husserl, 1973b, p. 90 ). Husserl grounded the notion of negation, usually conceived as a property of judgments or propositions, in the immediate perceptual experience of the world. In viewing a red ball, for example, I presume its redness and sphericity will extend to its backside. But if I turn it around and discover its backside is green and dented, a recasting of previous presumptions occurs. In Husserl's description (Husserl, 1973b, p. 88 ):
The new objective sense "green" in its power of impressional ful llment has a certitude of original power which overcomes the certitude of the prior anticipation of "being red." But the certitude which has been overcome is still present to consciousness, although with the character of the "null."
The previous presumption of a uniformly round, red ball is not erased but made "null." Husserl variously returns to such terms as 'annulment,' 'nullication' or 'canceling out' to describe how the misperception becomes corrected. A motorist on a hot day will often see a pool of water seemingly in the midst of long stretch of highway. But soon this vision is 'annulled' and perceived to be atmospheric. Jastrow's duck/rabbit picture, which Wittgenstein made famous, is an especially good pictorial contrivance whereby we witness the shifting from the perceptual signi cance of one meaning to another.
But Husserl's careful description of such perceptual corrections catches what
ordinary observance usually misses. The cancellation of the earlier perception is "retroactive" insofar as it modi es the earlier phases of perception (Husserl, 1973b, p. 89 ). When we thought the ball was wholly red, we did not see the whole of the ball. Our perception of a wholly red ball in fact depends on a fusion of horizons with immediate perceptions. When we discerned that it was, in fact, half-red, half-green and dented, the previous perception became annulled retroactively; prior anticipations were made "null."
Such corrections would be impossible if perception did not, from the beginning, include a fusion of anticipations of the whole object which are given as present, although yet unseen.
Husserl indicates that this 'canceling out' of a misperception has an analogue in the case of values and plans of action. In fact, as he states, it applies to every object of 'positional consciousness' (Husserl, 1973b, p. 90) :
What holds in the analysis of the example of external perception holds in analogous manner for every other intending, object-positioning consciousness (positional consciousness) and for its objectivities. there is a large bowl lled with oranges, apples and pears. The bowl of fruit need not be apprehended as an 'Object seized upon' (Husserl, 1950 (Husserl, , p. 82.3,19/ 1982 . It need not involve a 'heeding' of the fruit (Husserl, 1950 (Husserl, , p. 83.32ff./1982 . In pre-re ective consciousness we nd ourselves 'turning towards' or extending a 'regard-to' surrounding circumstances, as
Husserl states (Husserl, 1950 (Husserl, , pp. 81-83/1982 ). There has not yet been an 'objectifying turn' in which a thing or value is made into an object (Husserl, 1950 (Husserl, , p. 76.34/1982 .
If I pick up one of the pears and take a bite, I might consciously evaluate this brand of pears as particularly satisfying and make a mental note to buy more. with the belief that they are laced by toxic pesticides. As with the case of the half-red and half-green ball misperceived as wholly red, expectations of toxicity, and thereby anticipations of consuming food contaminated with pesticides, are drawn into the immediate perception of the object and understood as having been there all along. As the value of the fruit changes so do plans and actions dependent on those values. As values and decisions are absorbed as anticipations, they nullify previous values in a way that is analogous to misperception. There is no room for a pear to be both healthy and toxic. One value not only con icts with the other, it nulli es the other. As with the corrected perceptual meanings, previous values are not forgotten but rather their claim to an existing thing is made "null."
Returning to the incest taboo, erotic objects and objects of parental philia are clearly complex. In the language of Husserl's Ideas I, erotic objects and people subject to parental affection involve 'polythetic syntheses' (cf. Husserl, 1950 Husserl, /1982 . This terminology applies in that the eroticized individual is right for my beloved . . ." (Husserl, 1973a, p. 173.29-31) . By contrast, in the case of family members: "Every family member is a responsible subject, a subject which, in accordance with the circumscribed and special case, has an 'I should' born out of this generality" (Husserl, 1973a, p. 180.34-37 
Lingering Questions
Several outstanding questions need to be addressed to suf ciently explain the thesis offered here. These concerns may be addressed insofar as parental and child roles are conceived functionally in keeping with Husserl's analysis (Husserl, 1973a, p. 181.17-28) . The father or mother, as father and mother, and the same would apply to the single-parent, have the function of supporting the development and maturation of the child. This function is ongoing and its temporal horizons extend across the child's development. Nor need the parental commitment spring solely from parent/child love. Complementing the parents' own desire to raise their children is the force of law and public opinion which urges on the project. Granted that parenting involves numberless desires, plans, deliberations as well as perceptions and judgments, even so they cluster about ongoing continuous volitional intentions concerned with the child's maturation. The role of 'parent', whether single or not, presumes a commitment to these intentions. As such, the various oppositions which were suggested above enter in to the continuous project of the upbringing of offspring and extend throughout childhood and adolescence to maturity.
A second question concerns the 'temptation' of incest. On our account, parent/child love 'cancels out' erotic attraction. Such a 'temptation' would presumably also apply to the incest fantasies of children and would seem to rule them out. This question is a weighty one. The nulli cation of eros seems to y in the face of long-standing accounts whereby incest, real or imagined, leads to psychopathology. Not only Freud and his immediate followers, but also second and third generation psychoanalysts, often revising and correcting Freud's own theories, make incest, fantasized and real, a cornerstone of psychopathology. Further, there is an enormous body of psychological discussion of people who have dif culty integrating 'lust' and 'love'. On the one hand, cases are discussed of unfortunate people who are sexually cold or repulsed by spouses for whom they otherwise feel much affection. On the other hand, there is abundant discussion of people who cannot experience tenderness and care for their sexual partners. It is often supposed that these dif culties emerge from vestigial con icts retained from the eroticization of parents or parental gures.
Two responses may be offered. First, as mentioned before, it is Husserl's view that family roles have their lapses. The role of father or mother does not wholly absorb a person's subjectivity. In fact for Husserl, parental obligation requires that there is some degree of "neglect in the natural solicitude" of the father and mother to other family members, perhaps because of "omissions, moments of egoism or irrationality" (Husserl, 1973a, p. 180.21-2) . Thus even though parental roles nullify erotic attraction, the nulli cation need not apply to the totality of a person's wishes, strivings, desires, judgments, feelings, etc.
This would open the door, not only from the parents' side, but perhaps especially from the child's side, to the erotization of a parent or child due to a lapse from the constraints of parental/child love. This would at least address how lust might con ict with love insofar as conjugal love might have associations to parent/child love.
A second, perhaps more comprehensive, response requires that we consider, however brie y, a bias which, from the vantage point of the beginning of the twenty-rst century, seems to have been extended widely across early twentieth century psychological, sociological, anthropological accounts of the incest taboo. There is little question that incest, fantasized or real, even as part of normal human development, was a cornerstone of early twentieth century psychology, sociology and anthropology. Sir James Frazer's declaration, made early in the twentieth century, that "we may always safely assume that crimes forbidden by law are crimes which many men have a natural propensity to commit" (Frazer, 1910, p. 97) , was scarcely questioned when applied to the incest taboo. It was not only Freud and Lévi-Strauss and their schools which maintained that the incest taboo corrects instinctual behavior. Ranks of sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists, whose theoretical commitments were not only psychoanalytic and structuralist, but Marxist, cultural materialist, and radical social constructionist, presumed that incestuous desires were instinctual (cf. Smelser and Baltes, 2001, pp. 7259-62) . These researchers may have otherwise disagreed radically with each other; nonetheless, they widely concurred that the incest taboo was the product of imposing social conventions upon instinctual behavior. What they uniformly denied was that the proscription was somehow rooted in human nature.
By the second half of the twentieth century the bias according to which incestuous desires were elemental to human development began to be noted.
Reviving the work of the Finish sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher, Edward Westermarck, studies emerged which con rmed Westermarck's hypothesis that early childhood association inhibits sexual attraction. Westermarck had proposed decades earlier (Westermarck, 1926, p. 80 ):
Generally speaking, there is remarkable absence of erotic feelings between persons living very closely together from childhood. Nay more, in this, as in many other cases, sexual indifference is combined with the positive feeling of aversion when the act is thought of.
We cited before the testimony of kibbutz marriages and the Chinese practice of sim pua. Studies of McCabe (1983) and Walter (1997) In his introductory lectures in 1917, Freud suggested that his audience "would hardly recall without smiling" the view that "sexual attraction is diverted from members of the opposite sex in one family owing to their living together from childhood" (Freud, 1920, pp. 343-4 In response, then, to the issue of the 'temptation' to incest which has been established by the work of early twentieth century anthropological, sociological and psychological theory, at the very least, it is questionable whether we should presume the normality of incest fantasies and their vestigial impact upon adult life. This is not to deny that the abrogation of the incest proscription can, and does, result in psychological trauma and human tragedy.
But as the approach here has attempted to show, one need not appeal to a variety of social constraints to explain the taboo, e.g., the desire of men to have trophies in their wives, the desire for marriage by capture, superstitions 
Conclusion
It is argued that the approach offered here has several strengths. First it addresses why the taboo is universal among diverse human societies. As caused by the 'incompossibility' of two vital projects, it is universal because the projects of species reproduction and the parental upbringing of offspring are universal in human society. Further, since the taboo results from a radical con ict in meanings and their consequent actions, it explains that the taboo can be elicited by properly contrived literary presentations. Third, given the emotional repugnance borne out of a nulli cation of vital projects, it substantiates that the taboo is universally institutionalized in law and public morality. It thereby follows that, on the one hand, incestuous behavior can be psychologically traumatic for incest victims who experience the social proscription and the, too often, deliberate abuse of their victimizers perpetrated in view of the social proscription. It also follows that relatively innocuous cases of incestuous behavior can and, very likely, do exist, depending upon special social contexts and personal idiosyncrasies.
As to the three functional accounts of the incest taboo mentioned at the beginning of this paper, it is not contested that the incest prohibition has various functions: viz. 1) the prevention of the accumulation of recessive genes;
2) the sustaining of a more peaceful upbringing; and, 3) the fostering of extrafamilial social ties. That harmful effects arise from the capacity of incestuous unions to compound deleterious recessive genes seems to be proven. But even so, any one or all of these 'functions' may have arisen fortuitously along with the incest taboo and thereby have limited causal ef cacy. Further, these functions do not explain why a behavioral avoidance of incest does not appear in species other than human beings and, possibly, some primates.
After all, the prevention of the accumulation of recessive genes, the securing of maturation and the establishing of non-kinship bonds are useful to other species besides human beings and primates. But, the incest taboo is especially an aspect of human behavior. The intentionality of consciousness, by which we may re ect on the objects of our desires, and come face-to-face their discord, supplies that condition. Westermark, E. (1908) . 1) mutual recognition; 2) each party bears goodwill for the other; 3) each party wishes well for each other; 4) the goodwill and well-wishing is for reasons of virtue, pleasure or utility as found in the other. A suitable translation of philia is 'mutual regard. ' Hardie (1968, pp. 317ff.) offers an especially good account of the meaning of philia.
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Aristotle, in the Nichomachean Ethics, at 1157a13 and 1164a3, does discuss brie y philia relations that are also erotic, i.e. lovers who are also friends None of this discussion however applies to parent/child philia which, as argued, has the unique feature of parents and children regenerating or generating one's self. 
